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ARE You BEING SERVED?
THE CONSEQUENCES OF TELMEX
MONOPOLISTIC PRIVATIZATION
Luigi Manzetti*
1. MAIN ARGUMENTIN the 1990s many countries in the former Soviet bloc, Latin America,
Africa, and Asia adopted, in varying degrees, reforms aimed at re-
placing failed state intervention with market-driven policies. Theo-
retically, they were based upon the theories of neo-liberal economists
such as Freidrich von Hayek and Milton Freidman, whose ideas inspired
the political agenda of Augusto Pinochet, Margaret Thatcher, and Ronald
Reagan in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1989, important international finan-
cial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Bank, the U.S. Treasury Department, and think tanks came to
the conclusion that market reforms, based upon the same neo-liberal
ideas, were the only way to revive the ailing economies of less developed
countries. John Williamson described this convergence of policy prescrip-
tions as the "~Washington Consensus" because many of its proponents
were based in the U.S. capital. The Washington Consensus originally de-
veloped in the late 1980s as a set of policies to help Latin America to get
out of a decade-long stagnation period.' However, as more countries be-
gan to ask for the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) assistance,
its prescription came to be extended to other regions of the world moving
away from communism and ISI. Its main features were economic deregu-
lation, trade liberalization, and privatization. Among these three, priva-
tization was probably the most controversial because it symbolized the
reversal of decades of ISI and government control of the commanding
heights of the economy. Consistent with the von Hayek and Friedman
theories, the Washington Consensus argued that the divestiture of gov-
ernment (or state)-owned enterprises (SOEs) would accomplish both ec-
onomic and political goals. Economically, it would bring about
competition and consequently, better products, lower prices, and greater
attention to customers' needs. Politically, it would deprive politicians of
the discretionary power to favor powerful lobbies within the business and
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labor sectors and, in the process, prevent them from engaging in corrupt
and collusive activities.
However, despite its potential for creating growth and competitive
markets, the record of privatization worldwide to date is quite mixed.
Economists often point to technical difficulties, market failures, and lack
of secure property rights. Political scientists instead have stressed how
political opportunism was often associated with poor results and crony
capitalism. According to this line of thought, the way governments carry
out privatization and set up the regulatory policy (particularly in the stra-
tegically important sector of public utilities) is crucial. When govern-
ments manage a state divestiture process following political criteria in
order to retain political support from key socioeconomic vested interests,
privatization results in the re-assignment to well-connected groups in the
private sector. In turn, the early winners of the privatization process will
become the staunchest opponents of market competition and any subse-
quent effort to introduce competition in their monopolistic markets will
cause major losses to the country in terms of economic efficiency and
welfare improvements. In his "winner takes all" thesis, Hellman argued
that the beneficiaries of "politically managed" privatization processes will
do everything in their power
[tlo block specific advances in the reform process that threaten to
eliminate the special advantages and market distortions upon which
their own early reform gains were based. Instead of forming a con-
stituency in support of advancing reforms, the short-term winners
[will] seek to stall the economy in a partial reform equilibrium that
generates concentrated rents for themselves, while imposing high
costs on the rest of society. 2
The aim of this paper is to bring support to this argument by showing
how political considerations have played a crucial role in shaping Mex-
ico's regulatory framework in the telecommunications sector. Consistent
with the Hellman thesis, I will bring evidence of how, under monopolistic
conditions, the Mexican private telecommunications company has thus
far provided a service to consumers that is far below that of other Latin
American countries and has imposed unreasonable costs to domestic
businesses. In other words, the argument of this paper is that political
exigencies have conspired against the establishment of market competi-
tion in the telecommunications sector thus creating a significant obstacle
to the country's economic development.
11. ON THE ROLE OF REGULATION IN PUBLIC UTILITIES
By the 1950s Mexico, like the rest of Latin America, had acquired firm
control over the public utility sector under state ownership. This meant
that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in such areas as telecommunications,
2. Joel S. Hellman, Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcom-
munist Transition, 50:2 WORLDn PoL. 203, 204-05 (1998).
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telephones, and water and sanitation were left to regulate themselves
under the supervision of a variety of government departments or minis-
tries. By the late 1980s, hard-pressed by severe budget constraints, Mex-
ico came under intense pressure from the United States, the IMF, and the
World Bank to privatize many of its public utilities, which were plagued
by severe financial losses and were no longer capable of meeting basic
investment requirements in service coverage and technology upgrading.
In fact, since Mexico was the first large Latin American market to em-
bark upon utility privatization, it became an important test case for what
was at the time a spirited debate about the role of regulation in a market
economy with or without privatization.3 While most argued that priva-
tization was unavoidable since SOE management had failed, others con-
tended that it was not the type of ownership that mattered but rather the
way a public utility was actually run. As Noll noted in this regard, "The
key point is that operating efficiency is substantially improved if the en-
terprise faces a hard budget constraint and is relatively free of political
interference in its day-to-day business decisions."4 Eventually, the view
that privatization was always the best option became the dominant line of
thinking at the IMF and the World Bank, thus leading critics like Joseph
Stiglitz to contend that the two IFIs took too much of an ideological-
political stance that downplayed economic efficiency considerations.5 In
the early 1990s, the IMF and World Bank made financial assistance con-
ditional upon the adoption of the divestiture of SOEs in public utilities,
often relegating the establishment of a regulatory framework after com-
panies had been transferred to the new private owner. This quick and
dirty approach clashed with much of the literature on utility regulation,
which postulated the creation of regulatory institutions enforcing legal
and technical standards first, particularly in those markets characterized
by natural monopolies or where competition was difficult to achieve.6 In
fact, most experts underscored how the design of regulatory institutions,
3. Chile had privatized its public utilities in the late 1980s, but they were smaller in
size and the government was a military dictatorship, which left many skeptical
about the feasibility of such a radical policy under a democratic regime.
4. Roger G. Noll, On Privatizing Infrastructure Industries, World Bank Development
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WORID BANK, GLOBAL MONIlORING RiPowr 74, 131 (2005); JosEPHii E. S'ico-
rz, GL.OBALIZATION AND Irs DISCONTENTS 54 (2002); NGAIRE WoODs, TiH
GiOBALIZERS: THIE IMF, TIE WoLi) BANK, ANiD THIR BORROWERS 136
(2006).
6. See Roni-RT Birir Honwrrz, TiHE- IRONY OF REGutATRIORY REFORM: TIjn DuR-
EaULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONs 32 (1989); Ronald R. Braeu-
tigam, Optimal Policies for Natural Monopolies, in 11 HANDBOOK OF INDusTRIAL
ORGANIZAION 1289, 1290, 1298-99, 1342 (Richard Schmalensee & R.D. Willig
eds., 1989); William Glade, Privatization in Rent-Seeking Societies, 17 WoRat
DEV. 673, 673-82 (1989); Roger G. Noll, The Future of Telecommunications Regu-
lation, in REGULATING Ti.COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (Eli Noami ed. 1983);
Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 11 HAND-
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as well as their degree of independence from political institutions, was
pivotal in shaping utility companies' performance after privatization. Ac-
cording to Noll:
the performance is better if regulators are independent of both the
legislature and the executive, if regulatory processes are open and
transparent, if judicial review is speedy, if the standards for judicial
review clearly focus on whether the agency acted within its mandate
and had a reasonable basis for its decisions, if regulatory policy is
designed to favor largely unregulated competition, as opposed to
monopoly or managed competition, wherever competition is feasi-
ble, and if regulation of the residual monopoly is oriented towards
maximizing economic efficiency (including suppression of monopoly
pricing and anticompetitive behavior). Moreover, privatization is
likely to be more successful when most, if not all, of these govern-
ance institutions (including the commitment to competition) are in
place before privatization proceeds.7
Why then from the outset of the privatization process in Latin America
(including Mexico) have the IMF and the World Bank relegated the es-
tablishment of regulatory institutions to a second phase of the reform
process? There are three main reasons explaining such contradictory be-
havior. First, IFIs believed that the window of opportunity to privatize
could close quickly and putting in place a regulatory framework was time
consuming, which could give enough time to anti-reform forces to stop
state divestiture. Second, privatizing in a monopolistic way would allow
governments to increase their sale price. Third, both the World Bank and
the IMF wanted Mexico to pay back its loans quickly as more and more
countries in the early 1990s were seeking their financial assistance. Thus,
despite much rhetoric about creating competitive markets, IFIs were
quite willing to sacrifice a level playing field and efficiency gains to
achieve short-term political and financial goals.8 Ironically, this allowed
for the retention of much political discretion that, according to the IFIs
themselves, privatization was theoretically supposed to eliminate.
111. PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATORY
POLICY IN MEXICO
During the presidency of Raul Salinas (1988-94), Mexico went through
a radical shift in economic policy. In the aftermath of the financial crisis
of 1982, the U.S. government and the IMF provided Mexico with an
emergency loan package to help the country avoid bankruptcy. But, aid
came at a dear price as Mexico had to accept stiff conditions that forced
the country to reverse the import substitution industrialization develop-
ment model that had dominated macroeconomic policy since the late
1BOOK OF IND~USTRIAL ORG;ANIZATION 1253, 1254-58 (Richard Schmalensee &
R.D. Willig eds., 1989).
7. Noll, supra note 4, at 1-2.
8. See S'IGLITZ, supra note 5, at 76, 132.
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1920s. Under President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88), the country
started a painful process of economic restructuring by cutting government
expenditures and attempting some minor privatizations. But, it was
under Salinas that the thrust of market reforms, with strong hacking from
the United States, the IMF, and the World Bank (the latter two provided
both economic and technical assistance) began to truly reconfigure the
Mexican economy. Salinas not only drastically cut economic barriers to
pave the way for Mexico's bid to join the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), but also launched an ambitious state divestiture
program, which on paper was supposed to modernize the country's econ-
omy and improve its efficiency in allocating resources.
Salinas' privatization was a major turning point in defining the role of
the state in Mexico, and, as can be seen in Tables 1, 2, and 3, it reversed
six decades of steady state encroachment in the economy. By the time his
mandate was over, Salinas had either liquidated or privatized some 258 of
the country's most important SOEs. Some economic analyses have con-
tended that the overall effects of privatization in Mexico were positive in
terms of greater service provision, firms' profitability, productivity gains,
fiscal revenue, and overall welfare benefits for the poor.9 But, they also
acknowledged that the privatization process required transparency and
"[silpecial requirements such as bans on foreign direct investment or cash-
only payments [led] to substantial price discounts for firms sold." 10 In-
deed, political analyses of Mexico's privatization program under Salinas
and thereafter point out how many powerful domestic groups received
preferential treatment, which allowed them not only to acquire important
rents under monopolistic conditions but, in turn, enabled them to earn
enough cash flow to extend their clout in other lucrative markets .11
That political concerns were very important in shaping Salinas' divesti-
ture strategy was obvious from the outset. In a recent study, Murillo ar-
gues that two factors explain the way reforms in public utilities took place
in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico: 1) the level of political competition,
which determined the timing of reforms (the greater the amount of politi-
cal opposition in and outside of Congress, the less likely privatization
would occur), and 2) the partisan orientation of the incumbent, which
affected how much regulatory discretion would be used after privatiza-
tion (if the reforming president was a pragmatist reforming out of neces-
sity, he would do so in a way to still maximize state control) .12 Mexico
fits Murillo's "pragmatic" approach because the state divestiture process
affected public utilities unevenly. While telecommunications was priva-
9. See Rafael La Porta & Florencio L6pez-de-Silanes, The Benefits of Privatization:
Evidence from Mexico, 114 Q. J. oE. EC-ON. 1193, 1235-1237 (1999); Alberto Chong
& Florencio L6pez-de-Silanes, Privatization in Mexico, 5-6 (inter-Am. Dev. Bank,
Working Paper No. 513, 2004).
10. Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, supra note 9, at 3.
11. Jurni A. TP-ICHIMAN, PRIVATIZA-iON AND PO ITICAL CHANGE IN MEXICO 10-12,
89-92 (1995).
12. MARIA VICI-ORIA MURII iG, POiLITICAL COMPET[ITION, PAR IFISANSIIIP, AND) POLi
ICY MAKING IN LAT[IN AMERICAN PUBL IC UTIIIEvS 1 (2009).
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tized in 1990, electricity remained mostly under government control. In-
deed, Salinas ruled out the privatization of electricity and only in 1992 did
he allow some minor reform; but private investors could only enter the
generation part of the business and could only sell to SOEs. The reason
behind this inconsistent approach rests to a large degree on political
grounds. In fact, Salinas faced greater opposition to privatize electricity
than telecommunications, mostly because the former service privatization
could negatively affect a much larger number of consumers with obvious
political consequences. Let us now examine in some details the privatiza-
tion of the telecommunications sector.
IV. TELMEX PRIVATIZATION
Mexico established Telmex, the SOE with exclusive control of the tele-
communications sector in 1972 (which was rather late by Latin American
standards), but soon experienced the same problems as other countries in
the region including high deficits due to low tariffs, limited coverage, and
an increasingly outdated technology due to lack of investments. As the
fiscal deficit reached five percent of the gross domestic product in 1989,
privatizing Telmex offered Salinas an opportunity to raise some badly
needed funds.' 3 It would also send a clear signal to the international
community that Mexico was serious about implementing market reforms
by shedding one of its most important and potentially lucrative SO~s.14
Salinas made it clear from the start, however, that "[tihe government
should not directly control the economy but rather serve as an overseer
that would impose the discipline, order, and efficiency the system re-
quired." 15 Put differently, the government would reform, but on its own
terms not according to the tenets of free market economics as postulated
by neo-liberal theorists. According to Salinas' view, the Mexican govern-
ment would retain a substantial discretionary role in establishing the rules
of the game even after privatization was complete. To make Telmex fi-
nancially attractive, the Salinas administration decided to increase tariffs.
For instance, charges for local calls rose from 16 pesos per minute to 116
pesos per minute.' 6 The government also waived an indirect tax on tele-
phone service, ensuring that the remaining taxes would be incorporated
into the new tariff structure, and paid off most of Telmex's debt.
These concessions notwithstanding, the real deal maker was selling
Telmex as a vertically integrated company with exclusive monopolistic
conditions on all services. The president used three main arguments to
13. See Bradford De Long, Christopher De Long & Sherman Robinson, The Case for
Mexico's Rescue. The Peso Package Looks Even Better Now, FORI JON AFFr., May-
June 1996, at 8, 10.
14. See generally WORLD BANK, WORL D BANK CONFERENCE ON THE WLLFARE CON-
SEQUENCES OF SEL LING Punuic ENTERPRISES: CASE S-UDIES F-ROM CHILE, MA-
L AYSIA, ME-XICO, AND) THE UJ.K. (1992).
15. MIGUEL CENWI-ENO, DEMOCRACY WITHIN RE.ASON: TECHINOCRATIC REVOLUTI1ON
IN MEXICO 195 (2nd ed., 1994).
16. WORLD BANK, supra note 14.
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justify his controversial decision to turn a government monopoly into a
private monopoly. 17 First, by restricting bids to domestic investors (for-
eign minority stakeholders were allowed but primarily to provide the
needed technology and financing), the company would remain under
Mexican control. To accomplish that, the government created different
types of shares determining who would control the company. Mexicans
nationals were the only ones who could acquire shares granting "manag-
ing rights" which could not be sold until the monopoly period expired.
Second, foreign business partners demanded monopolistic conditions to
justify their investments in joint ventures with domestic firms where they
had to put up a large amount of capital to upgrade obsolete Telmex infra-
structure.18 Third, monopolistic conditions could justify the govern-
ment's demand upon the new owners to provide "universal service" to
low-income communities both in urban and rural areas, even though the
government committed itself to provide large subsidies to those commu-
nities after privatization. 19
Interestingly enough, several international investors had openly contra-
dicted the government's stance on the monopoly concession even before
the Telmex sale. In fact, some favored the option of breaking up Telmex
into smaller, regional operators, to keep investment, labor, and operating
costs down. Furthermore, some of the most distinguished consultants the
Mexican government hired for advice argued strongly in favor of the es-
tablishment of a competitive market rather than a monopolistic one .20
But, Salinas was determined to manage the Telmex privatization in a way
that would strengthen his political support and minimize opposition to his
leadership. First, by selling to a domestic investor under very lucrative
conditions, he could bring into his camp what was likely to become a
major company that would surely contribute generously to his Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party's electoral campaigns for years to come. Sec-
ond, a monopoly would also please the Telmex union, which would have
seen its bargaining power and workforce significantly reduced under a
competitive state divestiture. Indeed, the Telmex union was more than
happy to endorse the president's plan. After privatization, the union
bosses retained their privileged status, their affiliates kept their jobs, and
both gained financially as they obtained 4.4% of the company stock,
which appreciated considerably after the sale due to Telmex's high profit
margins. Third, by keeping the company in Mexican hands Salinas would
appease both left-wing political parties and the nationalistic faction
within his party, which were both ideologically against foreign invest-
ments. In conclusion, by the time the company was ready to be sold,
17. See Roger G. Noll, Priorities for Telecommunications Reform in Mexico 5 (Stan-




20. Roger Noll & Fernando Salas, Reestructuracidn y privatizaci6n de tel~fonos de
M~xico, Mimeograph, 1990.
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Salinas had effectively brought into his camp all the vested interest
groups and organizations which could have derailed the process.
The World Bank played a critical role both financially and politically.
In 1989, it provided Mexico a $500 million loan to fund its privatization
program and an additional $22 million in technical assistance in 1990 to
prepare for Telmex's divestiture. 2' It also publicly displayed strong sup-
port for Salinas' plans .22 Despite its early statements expressing a prefer-
ence for a privatization that would create a competitive environment, the
World Bank eventually approved the government's controversial priva-
tization method. In justifying its decision, the World Bank argued that
after all:
[s]ector solutions are shaped by the country's political institutions
and electoral arrangements, the interests of constituency groups and
the role of the government judiciary. Regulatory arrangements that
seem optimal from a sectoral viewpoint may not be feasible, and
compromise solutions are necessary. In particular, the economic
benefits of improved services following privatization of a state-
owned enterprise may well outweigh the rents captured by an imper-
fectly regulated monopoly.23
In the end, the main bidders were two domestic entrepreneurs: Ro-
berto Hernandez of the investment bank Acciones y Valores de M6xico
(Accival) and Carlos Slim, owner of Grupo Corso. Both were self-made
men who did not belong to the traditional Mexican business elite, but had
developed strong political ties with the ruling PRI. Slim, in particular,
had been involved in the NAFTA negotiations and had been an outspo-
ken endorser of Salinas' economic reform agenda. After lengthy closed-
door negotiations, Slim, in association with Southwestern Bell and France
T616com, prevailed and acquired Telmex in a deal that included a seven-
year monopoly clause for both domestic and international calls and re-
lated services. To sweeten the deal, the Mexican government did not es-
tablish any regulatory agency framework prior to the divestiture process,
and did not subject the company to anti-trust laws. Thus, until President
Ernesto Zedillo created the Federal Telecommunications Commission
(COFETEL) in 1996, the federal agency which would eventually oversee
the whole sector, regulation remained under the control of the executive
branch, specifically the Secretary of Communications and Transportation
(SCT), allowing the government to alter the concession contract as it saw
fit even after privatization. For example, the government delayed grant-
ing the licenses necessary to open the local domestic market to private
competition until 1995 and the long-distance calls market until late
1996 .24 Thanks to the government's manipulations, Telmex acted like an
unregulated monopoly for almost seven years.
21. WORI I) BANK, supra note 14.
22. Id.
23. Judith Mariscal, Telecommunications Reform in Mexico from a Comparative Per-
spective, 46 LATIN Am. PoL. & Soc'y 83, 91-92 (2004).
24. MURILLO, supra note 12, at 89.
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V. POLITICAL CLOUT AND REGULATORY CAPTURE
The Telmex acquisition allowed Slim to make large profits in a very
short period of time while also granting him tremendous political and
economic clout in Mexico. By the mid-1990s, the Corso Groups (within
which Telmex was the largest) accounted for about forty percent of Mex-
ico's stock exchange worth, granting Slim tremendous bargaining power
with political authorities. 25 As Mariscal noted:
With the purchase of Telmex, the only Mexican company with stock
traded in the international exchange markets at the time, Slim would
acquire an international profile. A large, integrated company also
conferred on its owners extensive political power. Indeed, this com-
pany became a strategic asset; any significant movements Telmex
stock made on the Mexican stock exchange influenced the financial
stability of the country.26
Such influence was instrumental in enabling Slim to convince Presi-
dents Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), Vincente Fox (2000-2006), and Felipe
Calderon (2006-present) to continue Telmex's dominance of the telecom-
munications sector in Mexico from 1994 onward. The continuation .of the
Slim-government cozy relationship could be seen in the aftermath of the
financial crisis that hit Mexico in 1995. That year a legislative proposal to
inject market competition after Telmnex's monopoly status was set to ex-
pire was substantially watered down. To help the government keep infla-
tion under control Slim agreed to refrain from price increases (for a
year). In return, the bill languished in Congress due to lengthy negotia-
tions as Telmex and its congressional backers from the PRI stonewalled
making significant concessions to open the Mexican market. By the time
Congress approved the new law, Telmex's interests had prevailed. First,
COFETEL that in the original bill was supposed to become an autono-
mous agency, remained under firm executive control. Second, the tele-
communications law restricted foreign investments, imposed stiff
investment requirements on new market entrants, and granted Telmex
substantial network rents. Also, although from 1996 to 1998 the govern-
ment eventually allowed some competition to offer services in paging,
wireless personal communication services (PCS), and internet, the new
companies had to use the Telmex network, which put them at a great
disadvantage. Moreover, Telmex's market power was strengthened by
the fact that it provided a large array of services that its competitors could
not. Thus, many customers selected Telmex precisely because it is a "one
stop shop" company. 27
The PRI eventually lost the presidency to the supposedly pro-business
center-right Partido Acci6n Naciona (PAN). In the mid-1990s the PAN
25. Mexican Billionaire Carlos Slim Promotes Public-Private Partnership to Boost De-
velopment. Growth, Aiti BUSINESS.COM, Mar. 29, 2006, http:If
www.allbusiness.com/north-america/mexico/877520-l html.
26. Mariscal, supra note 23, at 91.
27. Noll, supra note 17, at 10.
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had made the creation of telecommunication sector competition part of
its electoral platform, but once in power President Fox found it difficult
to move forward due to strong congressional opposition led by legislators
from the PRI and the left-wing Partido de la Revoluci6n Democritica
(PRD). Indeed, Slim seemed to have convinced politicians of all persua-
sions of the necessity of promoting Mexican capitalism through strong
government-private sector ties. In 2005, a year before the 2006 presiden-
tial elections, he disclosed the so-called "Acuerdo de Chapultepec" in
which he championed the idea of private-public partnerships to promote
major infrastructure projects. The PRI and PAN candidates enthusiasti-
cally supported the plan and, although unofficially, so did the PRD. But,
to many such a plan seemed to be a new dress for the old practice of
government-subsidized private capitalism.28 In conclusion, Telmex owes
the retention of its monopolistic status over two decades, regardless of
the party in power, to Slim's ability to protect government constituencies
and his generous campaign contributions to all major parties. Denise
Dresser described Slim's clout as follows:
Just as the PRI denied the existence of a regime that controlled eve-
rything, Carlos Slim denies any aspirations of an enterprise that
wants full control. Yet he is accomplishing this, signature by signa-
ture, consensus by consensus, applause by applause. The Acuerdo
de Chapultepec [is the vehicle] that legitimizes surrender. It symbol-
izes the collective permission to push for individual interests.29
As noted, the government manipulation of the telecommunications
sector after privatization favoring Telmex could be accomplished pre-
cisely because Salinas had retained a substantial amount of regulatory
discretion in the hands of the executive branch, which could be used to
pick winners and losers with relative ease. Even after 1996, when
COFETEL became operative, the agency could do little to reverse the
asymmetrical power relationship that Telmex had been able to develop
during the regulatory vacuum of the early 1990s. The agency has re-
mained chronically weak in enforcing rules since the SCT, which is very
susceptible to political considerations, still has the ultimate say in any de-
cision affecting telecommunications. Moreover, its decision-making pro-
cess is often secretive, cumbersome, and fails to exercise a true oversight
28. Besides keeping close ties with the leaders of Mexico's major parties, as part of his
popular outreach program Slim has created a number of charitable institutions
including the Telmex Foundation and the Carso Foundation, which fund a wide
array of health, education, and poverty alleviation programs.
29. Mexican Billionaire Carlos Slim Promotes Public-Private Partnership, supra note
25. In another article Dresser further commented about Slim's cozy relationship
with the Mexican political establishment in these terms, "Mexico has a dense, intri-
cate web of connections and personal ties between the government and the busi-
ness class. This ends up creating a government that doesn't defend the public
interest, that isn't willing to go out and regulate in the name of the consumer...
But it is rather willing to help its friends, its allies and, in some cases, its business
partners thrive at the expense of the Mexican people." Helen Coster, Slim's
Chance, FORBES, mar. 26, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/forbes2007/0326/134.html.
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role.30
Mexico's political system, characterized by weak checks and balances
and an executive very permeable to the lobbying influence of key interest
groups, has proved fertile ground for Slim's power of persuasion found a
fertile ground to sway things his way .31 Thanks to the acquiescence of
government regulators, Telmex has been able to corner the telecommuni-
cations market and engage in 1) systematic price gauging (charging much
higher prices than is considered reasonable or fair); 2) a variety of tactics
to delay, deny, or provide poor access to competitors to its network; 3)
the manipulation of price cap regulation (which adjusts the operator's
prices according to the price cap index that reflects the overall rate of
inflation) to its advantage; and 4) retain high charges for local calls even
though technological improvements have made such calls much cheaper
compared to 1990.32
The courts have not fared much better than the executive and the legis-
lature in promoting a level playing field. In the past fifteen years, chal-
lenges by telecommunications companies to Telmex's uncompetitive
practices have often fallen on the deaf ears of regulators and courts alike.
In fact, the Mexican courts have actually worked as an additional means
for Telmex to prevent competition. In a recent study, researchers found
that Telmex successfully used judicial injunctions to delay administrative
rulings and legal suits.3 3 Adding insult to injury, in several cases Telmex's
use of court injunctions enabled it to prolong litigation for several years.
To defend its monopoly status, Telmex points out that from 1990 to
2009 the number of fixed lines tripled (from 6.4 million to almost 19 mil-
lion) and so did its wireless business, which by 2006 had reached 50 mil-
lion units.34 Moreover, its productivity has improved tremendously,
ranking among the highest in the world. Equally important is the fact
that the large profits accrued over the years have enabled Telmex not
only to invest in improving service quality and availability at home, but
also to acquire other telecommunications companies around the world
(including the assets of AT&T Latin America, Brazilian Embratel, Ar-
gentine Techteland, and the Chilean Chilesatin) turning it into a cham-
pion of Mexican capitalism.35 Indeed, by 2010, Telmex had become the
30. Noll, supra note 17, at 25.
31. See Santiago Levy & David Walton, Equity, Competition, and Growth in Mexico:
An Overview, in No Growth Without Equity?: Inequality, Interests, and Competi-
tion in Mexico 24 (Santiago Levy & David Walton eds., 2009).
32. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Latin
American Competition Forum, Santiago, Chile, Sept. 9-10, 2009, Session IV:
Competition Issues in Telecommunications, Mexican Telecommunications Intercon-
nection Regime: Executive Summary 1, 5-7 (2009), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/63/4362891 4.pdf.
33. Rafael del Villar, Competition and Equity in Telecommunications, in No GRowrII1
WITuHOUT Eourry?: INFQUAITIY, INTEiRFSTS, AND) COMPrzriTION IN Mrxico 321,
333 (Santiago Levy & David Walton, eds., 2009).
34. Noll, supra note 17, at 4.
35. In 2004, Telmex acquired AT&T's Latin American operations, giving it a large
presence in Colombia, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Subsequently,
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largest publicly traded company in Latin America and was listed on the
Mexican Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the New York Stock Exchange.
Concomitantly, Carlos Slim had amassed a fabulous fortune, making him
the third-richest man in the world by 2009.
VI. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
TELMEX'S DOMINANCE
Despite these accomplishments, most observers, as noted at the begin-
ning of the paper, agree that the Telmex privatization has served Mexico
poorly. 36 In 2009, even the governor of the Mexican Central Bank, Guil-
lermo Ortiz Martinez, accused Telmnex of systematically obstructing com-
petition, forcing consumers to pay some of the highest rates in the world,
and creating a serious impediment to economic growth.37
To understand how Telmex's dominance has hurt Mexico, I will ex-
amine the data coming from Mexico as well as compare Telmex's per-
formance with that of companies in other countries for the provision of
the most important and widely used telecommunication services. For in-
stance, the National Index for Prices to Consumers (INPC) reflects the
fact that Mexicans spend a disproportionate amount of money on
Telmex's services when compared to other products (Figure 1). The im-
pact of Telmex's charges is so large because the company controls, among
other services, ninety-one percent of fixed phone lines (Figure 2). To bet-
ter comprehend Telmex's dominance in comparative perspective, Figure 3
shows the mobile market share of the largest provider vis-A-vis its com-
petitors in four countries with demographics similar to Mexico's (Hun-
gary, Turkey, Poland, and the Czech Republic). As it can be seen, Telmex
is by far the most monopolistic company in this sample. Such dominance
in fixed and mobile telephone (and a host of other services, including
cable) has allowed Telmex not only to financially outperform its'domestic
competitors (Figure 4) in excess of opportunity costs, but also to accrue a
tremendous amount of economic resources over the last twenty years.38
One of the negative results of this state of affairs, is that since Telmex
charges high fees for a host of services, this reduces the amount of service
demanded for fixed and mobile telecommunications (Figures 5 and 6).
Moreover, it negatively impacts Mexican businesses that are forced to
pay more than competitors abroad for the same service (Figure 7).
Telmex's monopolistic status has other adverse consequences as well.
Before privatization, Salinas justified transferring the company as a mo-
nopoly by arguing that, as part of the deal, the new operator would pro-
it bought Embratel, Brazil's largest and most important long distance operator, as
well as Chile's Chilesa and other smaller telecommunication companies in the Car-
ibbean. By 2010, Telmex had also established extensive cable services in most of
the Latin America markets where it was previously operating.
36. See Levy & Walton. supra note 31. at 6.
37. Mexican Billionaire Carlos Slim Promotes Public-Private Partnership, supra note
25.
38. See Noll, supra note 17, at 7.
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vide universal service for marginal areas that otherwise would be
unprofitable to cover.39 Did lower class consumers benefit from Telmex
privatization as Salinas originally claimed? According to Telmex, con-
sumers did benefit based on the number of fixed lines, mobile lines, and
the number of internet subscribers (as displayed in Figures 8a, 9a and
10a), and overall the company performs well by international standards.
But once the raw data is adjusted according to income distribution, Mex-
ico ranks among the worst performers, as seen in Figures 8b, 9b, and lob.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has tried to show that the collusive way in which President
Salinas privatized Telmex allowed its new owner, Carlos Slim, to adopt a
"winner takes all" approach that severely penalizes both Mexican con-
sumers and businesses. Moreover, it has shown how after Salinas, succes-
sive administrations have kept regulation policy under tight control,
allowing for a discretionary decision-making style that has discouraged
competition while enabling Slim's Grupo Carso to develop into one of
the most important Latin American multinationals. Consistent with
Hellman's theory, Telmex has become a major obstacle to market re-
forms in Mexico thanks to the connivance of political parties from all
sides acting with a misguided sense of economic nationalism.
But there are signs that some changes may finally take place. In 2009,
COFEILL auctioned new wireless bands for tixed and mobile telecom-
munications services. Furthermore, digital cable operators are now being
allowed to provide telephone services.40 But from an institutional stand-
point, as long as all three branches of government and the most important
political parties remain susceptible to the lobbying power of people like
Carlos Slim, Mexico will remain characterized by a highly concentrated
ownership in key sectors (in addition to telecommunications) that pre-
vent it from growing to its full potential.
The key question then becomes whether there will be the necessary
political will to change the status quo. As long as politicians' preferences
are shaped by narrow, short-term, partisan interests, it is likely that Slim
and his fellow billionaires in Mexico will exploit any crack in the system
to keep the current state of affairs in place, which does not bode well for
the future.
39. Less known to the public was the fact that after privatization the Mexican govern-
ment provided hefty subsidies for universal coverage.
40. See David Adams, Mexico's Telephone Titan. PODFR 360 (Feb. 2010), http://
www.poder360.com/article-detaii.php?id-.article=3570&pag=I.
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TABLE 1. STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN
MEXICO 1917-2003 41
Number of SOEs
Main Focus of State Activity Period (end of period)
Public administration, creation of infrastructure,
administration of natural resources and 1917-1940 36
provision of basic services.
Import-substitution oriented investments
(capital-intensive and long-maturity areas; 14-94144
industry input suppliers); transportation and 19-94
communications; and social security institutions.
Stable development, unplanned expansion:
Regional development, production expansion, 1955-1970 272
and creation of employment.
Planned expansion: oil bonanza, government as 1971-1975 504
an industrial investment engine.
Planned expansion: Bank nationalization,
government investment in strategic areas and 1976-1982 1,155
takeover of firms in distress.
Main program of liberalization of the economy 1983-1993 258
and divestiture of the state owned sector.
Consolidation of the privatization program: 1994-2003 210
public utilities and pension system. I____ I________
TABLE 2. STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 1982-200342
1982-1988 1989/1993 1994/2003
Total at the beginning of period 1,155 666 258
Creation 59 39 108
Liquidations / Shutdowns 294 193 58
Mergers 72 17 16
Transfers 25 11 26
Privatizations 157 226 56
tn Process* 37
Total at the end of the period: 666_ 258 210
41. Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, supra note 9, at 8 tbl.1.
42. Id. at 10 tbl.2.
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TABLE 3. THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM IN
PERSPECTIVE
4 3























43. Id. at 11 tbi.3.
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INPC: .National Index for Prices to Consumers
Source: Banxico. www.banxico.org.mx
FIGURE 24 COMPETITVE AND CONSUMER
LANDSCAPE IN MEXICO
Fixed Telephone Line Service
Distribution in Mexico
Others, 8% Cable, 1%
Telmex, 91%
Source: Cofetel. Reporte de actividades 2006-2007, Telmex. Reporte del ler
trimestre 2007, Canitec
44. Alejandro Puente, President of Canitec, What Keeps Holding the Mexican
Economy Back?: A Discussion on Competition and Consumers, Lessons from the
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FIGURE 447 COMPETITVE AND CONSUMER
LANDSCAPE IN MEXICO





Source: Meril Lynch, 2007
$1,730

















46. Id. at 7.
47. Id.. at S.
$889
798 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16
FIGURE 548 COMPETITVE AND CONSUMER
LANDSCAPE IN MEXICO
Los-usage Fixed Residential Service Fees
Source: OCDE Communications Outlook 2007. Focus on Mexico
FIGURE 649 COMPETITVE AND CONSUMER
LANDSCAPE IN MEXICO
OECD basket for low-usage mobile telephony sesrvice
Source: OCDE Communications Outlook 2007. Focus on Mexico.
48. Id. at 9.
49. Id. at 10.
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FIGURE 750 COMPETITVE AND CONSUMER
LANDSCAPE IN MEXICO






Source: OCDE Communications Outlook 2007. Focus on Mexico.
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FIGURE 9B (ADJUSTED BY INCOME)54
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FIGURE 10B (ADJUSTED BY INCOME)56
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